The emerging intelligent applications in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS), such as product inspection by deep-learning-based image recognition technology, are highly computationconsuming. However, the smart devices without sufficient computing resources fail to handle this kind of applications. Moreover, the Internet has very high latency compared with the local network which fails to meet the requirements of time-sensitive tasks, therefore we can not offload these tasks over the cloud. Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) brings the opportunities to offload the tasks of ICPS to the MEC servers to satisfy strict latency requirements, as well as to meet the demand for security requirements. Considering MEC servers owned by the third parties, resource allocation in MEC should be solved jointly with network economics to maximize the utility of system. In this paper, we investigate the task offloading problem under the access capability, latency and security constraints. Specifically, we present a novel Adaptive Task Offloading (ATO) auction mechanism to determine which MEC server to offload with access capability and security constraints, and how to schedule tasks with various deadline constraints, which incentives the third party of MEC providers to share their computing resources with the maximum profit. According to our theoretical analysis, the proposed auction mechanism has the properties of individual rationality, computational efficiency and truthfulness. Extensive simulations have been conducted to evaluate the performance of ATO auction and the experimental results show our method provides better solutions with the classic greedy algorithms in terms of maximizing the utility of the MEC server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems(CPS) is an emerging approach that concentrates on the integration of computational functions, such as data and information processing, with physical devices [1] . Nowadays CPS are widely applied in the industrial domain. The Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) as the key innovative actions, have been launched in various programs all over the world, e.g. Initiative ''Industrie 4.0'' in German [2] , ''Smart Manufacturing'' in USA [3] , ''Made in China 2025'' [4] , IVI (Industrial Value Chain Initiative) in Japan [5] , ''Industrial National Plan 4.0'' in Italy [6] , etc. CPS in industrial infrastructures requires a high level of decision-making capabilities in terms of The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhammad Maaz Rehan .
''autonomic'' with self-decision processes and ''collaborative'' with negotiation-based decision processes, which needs the smart devices in ICPS to handle computational-intensive tasks.
The skyrocketing applications of ICPS, such as product inspection by deep-learning-based image recognition technology have placed severe demands on low-latency, high reliability and stability [7] - [9] , while cloud infrastructure fails to meet the above demands due to the network uncertainty. Moreover, the above demands also urge burdens on communication and computation techniques of smart devices, which becomes the obstacles in terms of data processing, data latency and data access. These requirements involve the need for highly localized services at the network edge in local proximity to smart devices. In light of this, the Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) technology has emerged, VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ with the goal of offloading the cloud services to the network edge. In addition, MEC servers typically belong to different authorities and are profit-driven. Hence, smart devices need to take the offloading cost, such as the payment to MEC server for offloading service, into account when they decide whether to offload tasks or not. In this paper, we consider the general scenario of ICPS deployed with multiple MEC servers in one smart factory, as shown in Figure 1 where many assembly lines are on operation at the same time. Smart devices (mobile robots, Automatic Guided Vehicles-AGVs) equipped within each assembly line generate multiple computation-sensitive tasks with heterogenous constraints on their response time. In order to offload the computation burden from the cloud to MEC servers, the system needs the ability to deal with task offloading scheduling, such that MEC servers can complete tasks within diverse deadline constraints. Meanwhile, production lines require that the inspection system can handle online task flows. Furthermore, there exists the limitation of access bandwidth for each MEC server, and it needs to be taken into consideration when smart devices select MEC servers for computation offloading. The current research on task offloading either ignores the security requirement of offloading tasks [10] - [12] , or fails to give considerations to both the heterogeneity of deadlines and the incentive of resource sharing for MEC servers [13] - [15] . The intelligent applications in ICPS have rigid diverse requirements on task offloading, including security of service, heterogeneity of demands and incentives of resource provision. For instance, the industrial data usually have security levels and offloading tasks have diverse constraints on latency. In addition, the MEC server provided by the third parties need sufficient motivations to share their computing resource. Therefore, it is imperative to design a new incentive mechanism for task offloading combined with security and heterogeneity in ICPS.
In this paper, we will design a holistic solution for joint computation offloading and resource allocation in the multi-server MEC network, such that as many as tasks can be offloaded to MEC servers and can obtain computation results before their deadlines, in the meanwhile, MEC servers can gain the approximate maximum profits. Specifically, we consider a large ultra-dense network of ICPS where multiple MEC servers provide computation offloading services for smart devices. In order to make the inspection system of ICPS satisfy the requirements of multiple productions and assembly lines, there are some major challenges that need to be addressed. First, the complexity of task offloading decision-making should be handled to satisfy various deadline constraints. Second, how to incentive MEC servers to share computation resource is critical for task offloading. Third, account for various offloading amounts, the incentive mechanism should adapt to the amount pattern of offloading tasks. Last but not least, the scheduling methods should process the online tasks for the real-time inspection system.
The main contributions are concluded as follows.
• In order to tackle the challenges of the complexity of task offloading, incentive efficiency and the real-time requirement for ICPS applications, we present a novel Adaptive Task Offloading (ATO) auction mechanism for online computation offloading with various deadlines guaranteed, which can adapt to various task patterns in edge computing.
• In order to meet the requirements of access capability and security, ATO selects the MEC server for each user by matching of security levels of MEC servers and users, as well as access capability.
• Both theoretical analysis and numerical simulations demonstrate that our proposed ATO auction mechanism has three desirable properties: a) computational efficiency, b) individual rationality, c) truthfulness, as well as higher performance than other classic greedy algorithms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related work is discussed in Section II. Section III presents the overview of ATO framework and system model. In Section IV, we present the design of the ATO auction mechanism and prove its desirable properties. Our theoretical analysis and numerical evaluations are depicted in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The contribution of our work lies at the intersection of three critical cutting-edge research topics. (1) Multiple MEC servers selection; (2) Offloading scheduling; (3) Incentive mechanisms for edge computing. Combining the above cases, a fundamentally novel adaptive task offloading auction mechanism is proposed for the ICPS system with multiple MEC servers and multiple users.
A. MEC SERVERS SELECTION
Considering multiple heterogenous MEC servers are placed on the factory area, current research focused on the selection of multiple MEC servers based on their locations, or load distribution or access capability, etc. Reference [11] selected MEC servers based on the predicted cost with the prior knowledge on load distribution of MEC servers, and made load balance among different MEC servers. Reference [10] exploited the k-means algorithm to make network partitions of edge servers, then decided which edge server to choose for task offloading. The authors of [16] tackled the edge service placement problem with the limitation of constraint budgets and transferred this problem to a novel combinatorial contextual bandit learning problem to select the optimal limited number of edge sites. Reference [12] selected the MEC server with more favorable uplink channel condition to save transmission energy consumption, and allowed servers to transfer tasks to neighboring servers to eliminate the bottleneck caused by the limited resources on each MEC server. However, the above MEC servers selection methods fail to consider the security levels of MEC servers which is quite critical for the industrial data.
B. OFFLOADING SCHEDULING
Task offloading is a fundamental solution to achieve low latency, high bandwidth and stability for the mobile computing scenarios and adopted in two widely models, including partial computation offloading [17] - [19] and binary offloading, in which the tasks at each user are partitionable and nonpartitionable, respectively. Since the tasks in ICPS systems are mostly with the atomic property, we focus on the binary offloading model. Given the heterogeneous requirements of offloaded tasks and limited capabilities of MEC servers, [14] investigated the task offloading scheme and how to execute offloaded tasks. Reference [15] proposed a price-based distributed method to schedule offloaded computation tasks based on the Stackelberg game, which can obtain the equilibrium to make both users and MEC servers with maximized utilities. Authors of [20] considered the communication cost for data offloading, combined with the optimization of computation resource. Taking the instability of downlink channels into account, [21] presented a novel idea of computation replication to accelerate the downloading speed. The authors of [22] presented a multi-queue model to explore the impact of offloading policies on the performance of IoT devices combined with their assigned edge computing server. However, previous work in this field neglects the heterogenous deadline constraints on offloaded tasks, which needs to be carefully considered in depth.
C. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR EDGE COMPUTING
The design of incentive mechanisms is given more attention in mobile edge computing, such as data offloading, task offloading and caching. Reference [13] presented a coalition game-based pricing scheme to offload data from mobile devices to MEC servers. Reference [23] proposed a new market-based framework for offloading heterogeneous capacity-limited nodes to the network edge, and obtained the equilibrium by two proposed distributed algorithms. Reference [24] presented a novel model for allocating computational resource in edge network by establishing resource sharing contracts with edge infrastructure providers. Meanwhile, the proposed schemes can complete tasks as well as meet latency requirements. However, the current work on incentive mechanisms for edge computing cannot be applied for the ICPS task offloading scenario with multiple heterogenous MEC servers and users.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we give an overview of the ATO, system model for the task offloading in edge computing scenario and formalize the offloading schedule problem.
A. FRAMEWORK
The ATO framework supports ICPS systems with heterogeneous MEC servers and multiple users (smart devices), which can be applied to scenarios where IoT smart devices (such as smart cameras, mobile robots and AGVs, etc.) need to offload computation tasks to MEC servers. ATO consists of a set of users (smart devices) and a set of MEC servers.
To solve the problem of high latency in cloud computing, ATO offloads the computation tasks from smart devices to MEC servers. Figure 1 illustrates one of the realistic scenarios of using our ATO framework, i.e. the smart devices equipped within the assemble lines in one factory want to offload computation tasks to its neighboring MEC servers. The user (one smart device) chooses which MEC server to offload tasks based on the security levels and the access capability of MEC servers. The MEC server decides how to schedule the offloading tasks with various deadline constraints, such that its utility is maximized. In the ATO auction, the MEC server acts as the seller to share its computation resource and each user plays the role of buyer who offers the monetary payment to its offloaded MEC server.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Users first generate a set of computation tasks, denoted as T = {1, . . . , i, . . . , N }, thus N is the total number of tasks and |T | = M . User i generates one task t i and selects the targeted server to offload t i from a set of MEC servers in the neighborhood, symbolized as S = {1, . . . , j, . . . , M }. Since industrial applications have diverse security requirements, user i has a security level l i for its offloaded task, which is only allowed to offload to the MEC servers with higher security level L j , where L j ≥ l i . Thus, according to diverse demands on security, user i generates the list of authorized MEC servers, denoted as S i , S i ∈ S and {L j ≥ l i |j ∈ S i }.
Next, based on location information of MEC servers, user i selects the targeted server with maximum access capability from S i for the stability of transmissions. After the period of server selection, each user sends the offloading request to its selected MEC server. Hence, each MEC server obtains a set of task requests T j , T j ∈ T . The details of server Selection Algorithm based on its Security levels and Access capability (SASA) is described in section IV-A1.
In addition, each user announces the amount-deadline-bid triad (o i , d i , b i ) to its targeted MEC server, where o i is the offloading amount, d i is the deadline of task completion, and b i is the highest price that user i is willing to pay when the offloading task is accomplished. Based on the amountdeadline-bid triad received from each user, MEC server j selects a subset of task requests T offloaded ∈ T j to offload and computes the payment p i for each user. How to select the task requests, schedule these tasks with their deadline constraints and determine the payment will be discussed in Section IV.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each task can only be offloaded to one selected MEC server and each MEC server can operate only one task at the same time due to limited computation resources. In addition, all task executions are atomic operations, where tasks run completely independently of any other processes. The computation resource of MEC server is divided into different time slots with equal length, which is determined by applications. For simplicity, we first focus on the current time slot for the offloading schedule, then we can easily expand it to the consequential time slots. Table 1 lists the frequently used variables and their notations in this paper. 
C. UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Due to the diverse computation capability of heterogeneous devices, the offloading benefit of each user depends on task urgency. Hence, the user's payoff is related to the saving time by offloading. It is called users whose offloading requests are accepted as winners. The utility of each winner is defined as
where α is a factor to evaluate the benefit of the saving time by offloading, c i is the user i's computation capacity, and p i is user i's payment for offloading t i with p i ≤ b i . The utility of MEC server j's is defined as
Since MEC servers belong to various providers, we consider maximizing each MEC server's utility rather than the whole servers when MEC server decides the offloading schedule and each winner's payment with diverse deadline constraint. Both the offloading schedule scheme and the payment computation approach are assumed to be common knowledge among users. Meanwhile, each selfish user will exploit this knowledge to choose a bid to maximize its own utility, which is shown in equation (1) . We also assume that users do not collude.
D. OFFLOADING SCHEDULE PROBLEM
Since MEC servers are provided by different third parties, they need to obtain the profit as much as possible from a practical business perspective. In the meantime, MEC servers can obtain the payment from users only when the offloaded tasks are completed before their deadlines. Hence, the definition of the Offloading Schedule problem is given in the following.
Definition 1: Offloading Schedule (OS) Problem: Given a set of offloading requests T j , one MEC server j decides the offloading schedule, including which tasks to be offloaded, how to schedule them with the goal of maximizing its utility u j s ? It is easy to deduce that the utility of MEC server is maximized when p i = b i . The OS problem can be formalized as an optimization problem in the following.
where t i is the completion time of task i.
E. AUCTION METHOD
ATO adopts the forward auction which contains multiple buyers and a single seller, where the buyers (smart devices) send bids to compete for the offered computational resource of MEC servers. The one who gives the highest bid will win the competition. We use Figure 2 to illustrate the auction process between users and MEC servers.
• Server Selection: We present a server selection approach to discover the targeted MEC server for task offloading based on the matching of security levels and access capability of MEC servers, which makes sure the offloading task with required security promise and transmission stability.
• Adaptive Offloading Schedule: According to users' information of amount-deadline-bid triad, MEC server decides which task requests to accept and how to schedule these accepted tasks with various deadline constraints. Since users have selfishness, they intend to lie a lower bid price for offloading service to obtain a higher utility.
• Payment Determination: The pricing algorithm is proposed to avoid users' cheating behaviors. MEC server computes the actual payment that each winner should pay and returns the results of offloaded tasks to the corresponding users. In addition, we aim to design an incentive mechanism that satisfies the following desirable properties.
• Computational Efficiency: the offloading schedule can be computed in polynomial time.
• Individual Rationality (IR): each user will have a non-negative utility.
• Incentive compatibility (IC): (also called truthfulness) each user always prefers reporting his private information truthfully to MEC servers rather than any potential lie, i.e.; the user will get the maximum utility when it reports its bid as its cost plus its basic revenue.
IV. MAIN DESIGN OF ATO
In this section, we describe the details of Adaptive Task Offloading Auction that can be applied for ICPS.
A. ADAPTIVE TASK OFFLOADING AUCTION
The ATO auction mechanism is designed on the ground of Myerson's famous characterization [25] , illustrated in theorem 1. Theorem 1: Based on the theorem in [26] , an auction mechanism is truthful if and only if:
1) The Offloading Scheduling (OS) algorithm is monotone: If user i wins the auction by bidding b i , it also wins by bidding b i ≥ b i . 2) Given the OS algorithm, there is a unique truthful mechanism associated with this scheduling algorithm.
Each user with offloaded tasks should pay MEC server the critical value p i calculated by the corresponding pricing algorithm: the lowest bid the user could claim and still win when all other users' bids are fixed, i.e., task i would not be offloaded if it bids a lower price than this value. Proof: The theorem in [26] is applied in the reverse auction. In our forward auction, it has a similar property. For the first condition, the bid price b i is the highest payment that user i is willing to give if MEC server offloads its task. Hence, if user i' task can be offloaded with b i , it must also be offloaded when user i is willing to give a higher payment b i , i.e., b i ≥ b i . For the second condition, as the result of Theorem 2.1 in [26] , we can easily obtain that the payment to each winner is inf{b i , i is the winner}, i.e., the tight lower bound of bids that user i can claim and is still a winner.
1) MEC SERVER SELECTION
In this section, we give the details of the MEC server Selection Algorithm (SASA) for each user by taking the Security and Access constraints into consideration. First, each user generates its authorized list of MEC servers, according to the matching result of security levels. Next, each user selects the targeted MEC server with a maximum achievable transmission rate. The SASA algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MEC Server Selection Algorithm
Input: Security levels of MEC servers L, users security levels l, locations of MEC servers and users. Output: The selected MEC server S * for user i.
The propagation model of the indoor mobile wireless environment [27] is used to evaluate the channel capacity. According to the Shannon-Hartley formula, the maximum achievable rate from user i to MEC server j can be calculated by the equation that
where the path loss PL(d ij ) = PL(d 0 )+10φ log 2 (d ij /d 0 )+X σ denotes the local average received signal power relative to the transmit power, B j is the bandwidth of MEC server j, n j denotes the noise power at the MEC server j and φ is a parameter to denote the power law relationship between distance and received power. PL(d 0 ) is the path loss at a known reference distance d 0 and X σ denotes a zero mean Gaussian random variable that reflects the variation in average received power that naturally occurs.
2) ADAPTIVE OFFLOADING SCHEDULE
In this part, we first present two simple greedy algorithms for task offloading scheduling, then analyze the impact of task patterns (defined in Def. 2) on their performance. In order to match various task patterns, we design a novel adaptive task offloading scheduling algorithm. Theorem 2: The OS optimization problem is an NP-hard problem.
Proof: We prove the NP-hardness of the OS optimization problem by giving a polynomial time reduction to the Knapsack problem, which is one of the classic NP-complete problems.
Knapsack problem instance: There are n items with size s 1 , s 2 ,· · · , s n , value v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n , capacity W and value V . Question: Does there exist a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} such that i∈S s i ≤ W and i∈S v i ≤ V ?
The mapping instance of the OS optimization problem is established as follows. The bid of each task is mapping to the value of each item, the offloading amount is mapping to the size of each item, and the deadline of each task is mapping to the capacity. Since the capacity is fixed in the Knapsack problem, we reduce the deadline of each task into the same value. It is easy to get that the mapping process can be done by taking O(n) time complexity.
Hence, it is obvious that q is a solution of one Knapsack instance, if and only if it is a solution of the mapping one of OS optimization problem. Moreover, the reduction from Knapsack instance to OS instance is in polynomial time.
As seen in Theorem 2 that the OS problem is NP-hard, we design feasible greedy algorithms to solve this problem. The naive scheduling scheme is to Schedule tasks based on the Unit Price (SUP) or the Total Price (STP). The highlight of SUP is that MEC server schedules tasks by the unit price of each task, i.e., the bid value per time unit, which equals to the bid divides the computation time. For STP algorithm, the scheduling baseline is according to the total price, i.e., the bid value of each task. In light of the computation consumption, we divide all tasks into two classes, including 1) the ones with the large offloading amount and 2) the ones with the small offloading amount. In this paper, we use the ratio of the number of tasks in the first class and the total tasks as the metric γ to represent the task pattern, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2: Task pattern is defined as the distribution of the above two classes, which is explored from the historical task requests within a learning window W , such as 100 time slots. In order to explore the impact of task patterns, we generate synthetic task flows with various task patterns. Figure 3 demonstrates the performance of both simple greedy schemes with different γ . We can see that SUP has better performance than STP when tasks with large amount dominate. Through this simulation result, we find that the performances of both scheduling algorithms are significantly influenced by task patterns. For the sake of matching various task patterns, we therefore design an Adaptive Offloading Scheduling (AOS) algorithm.
Based on simulation results in Figure 3 , we observe that when γ < 0.5, the performance of SUP is better than STP, while γ > 0.5 makes the opposite. Therefore, we set the threshold of task pattern is γ = 0.5. Sorted T in decreasing order by (b i · c s )/o i → T sorted 5: else 6: Sorted T in decreasing order by b i → T sorted 7: end if 8: for t i in T sorted do 9: Scheduling(t i ) 10: if t i is accepted then 11: T accept ← T accept ∪ t i 12: else 13: T reject ← T reject ∪ t i 14: end if 15 : end for 16: Delete tasks in T accept from W L In Algorithm 2, the current task pattern γ can be identified by the Task Pattern Learning (TPL) scheme with the learning window W . If γ ≤ 0.5, MEC server adopts SUP scheme and sorts tasks by (b i · c s )/o i in descending order, shown in Lines 3-4. Otherwise, MEC server chooses STP scheme and sorts tasks by b i in descending order, shown in Lines 5-6. The scheduling function in Line 8 is operated as follows. Above all, MEC server should keep all executing tasks without interruption. Hence, the deadline of the allocated task should change to the ending time of execution t end i . Next, MEC server calculates the computation time of task i, τ i , and finds the idle time period , satisfied min{d
end is the ending time of idle period i . If there exists such an idle period, task i can be offloaded, and joins the accepted set T accept , shown in Lines 9-10. Otherwise, task i will be added to the rejected set, T reject , shown in Lines 11-12. Finally, all accepted tasks will be deleted from the waiting list W L .
Discussion: In the current time slot, the rejected users try to send offloading request again with a reduced offloading amount and its corresponding bid. In order to make sure that the submission times bounded by m j , where m j is determined by MEC server j, the offloading amount reduces o i /m j in each time. The rejected users will keep trying to compete the opportunity of offloading service by reducing the offloading amount until any of the following three conditions is satisfied. 1) The offloading task is accepted. 2) The corresponding bid becomes non-positive. 3) The current computation resource is fully occupied before its deadline.
3) PAYMENT DETERMINATION
After tasks are scheduled by Algorithm 2, we design a Payment Determination (PD) algorithm, summarized in Algorithm 3 Payment Determination Algorithm Input: Accepted offloading tasks in current time slot. Output: Payment for each accepted task. 1: for t a in T accept do 2:
for t i in T sort \ t a do 4: Scheduling(t i ) 5: if t i in T reject and t i is accepted then 6: if γ ≤ 0.5 then end if 11: end if 12: end for 13: end for Algorithm 3, to encourage users to bid honestly, which relies on Theorem 2. In Algorithm 3, the outside for-loop (Lines 1-9) is to calculate the critical bid for each user whose task t a ∈ T accept . Each inside for-loop (Lines 3-9) aims to obtain user i's lowest bid whose task can still be allocated in this iteration. Tasks are first scheduled from T sort \ t a that is the set of sorted tasks without task t a . If the scheduling function can find the first task t i which can not be allocated with waiting list of T sort , while accepted with waiting list of T sort \ t a , the lowest bid is b i · c i · o a /o i when the adopted scheduling algorithm is SUP, shown in Line 7. In the other case that the adopted scheduling algorithm is STP, the lowest bid is the bid of user i, b i . If it fails to find such t i , the lowest bid is still itself, b a . After the above pricing, the mechanism can promise that each user will bid honestly.
4) A WALK-THROUGH EXAMPLE
We use the example in Figure 4 to illustrate how the ATO auction mechanism works. We set the offloading request of user i to be req i =
where i is the user i's ID, and each scheduled task is described as
Each user's truthful bid b i is set as the difference between the benefit e i earned from the time saved by offloading and the basic revenue δ i ≥ 0, i.e.
We obtain the metric γ by TPL scheme and assume γ ≤ 0.5 in this example. Hence, we adopt SUP algorithm for the offloading schedule.
Offloading Schedule: • For req 4 , T reject = {req 4 }. The above schedule list is illustrated in Figure 5 . Payment Determination: 3 , req 2 , req 4 }. req 4 ∈ T reject in offloading schedule process is allocated in this iteration, p 3 = 100/1000 · 1000 = 100.
B. THEOCRATICAL ANALYSIS OF ATO AUCTION
In this section, we will demonstrate that our proposed incentive mechanism of ATO auction achieves the desired three properties: computational efficiency, individual rationality and truthfulness.
1) COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY

Lemma 1: ATO Auction is computationally efficient.
Proof: We first analyze the computational complexity of the AOS algorithm. Set n = |T |, T is the set of tasks in waiting list in the current time slot. The time complexity of sorting T in descending order of unit price or total price in Line 3 or 5 is O(nlogn). The for-loop is at most n. Set the number of tasks in the current scheduling list to be m, and the idle periods in scheduling function are at most m + 1. Thus, the for-loop of Line 6-11 costs O(mn). Hence, the offloading schedule algorithm runs in O(mn) time.
After tasks are scheduled following the schedule list, we compute the running time of PD algorithm. In each iteration of offloading schedule in the set of T sort without the task under pricing (Lines 3-4), the process is similar to algorithm 2 (Lines 6-7). Thus, the time complexity of finding the first task in T reject to replace the task under pricing is O(mn). Moreover, the number of outside for-loop is at most m, since each for-loop completes the pricing process for eachxxxs accepted task. Therefore, the payment determination algorithm takes O(m 2 n), which dominates the whole ATO auction. It is obtained that the running time of ATO auction mechanism is bounded by O(m 2 n).
2) INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Lemma 2: ATO auction is individually rational.
Proof: In the AOS algorithm, Line 8 of Algorithm 2 aims to allocate tasks by the decreasing order of unit price or total price, while Line 4 of algorithm 3 tries to allocate the task exclusive of t a . Set t i is the first allocated task among T sort \ t a which is in T reject set when algorithm 2 is executed. When the offloading schedule adopts SUP, if and only if (b a · c a )/o a ≥ (b i · c i )/o i is satisfied, t a can be allocated in offloading schedule period. Since t i is sorted behind t a in offloading schedule process, it is obtained that the payment p a of task t a :
Since b a = e a −δ and δ ≥ 0, it can be easily obtained b a ≤ e a . Combine with equation (7), we can get p a ≤ b a ≤ e a .
According to the definition of user' utility, it is deduced that u a = e a − p a ≥ 0. On the other hand, when the offloading schedule adopts STP, if and only if b a ≥ b i is satisfied, t a can be allocated in offloading schedule period. For a similar reason, we can obtain p a = b i ≤ b a and u a ≥ 0. Hence, ATO auction can guarantee that all users' utility is non-negative.
3) TRUTHFULNESS
Lemma 3: ATO auction is truthfulness.
Proof: As long as both conditions in Theorem 2 can be satisfied, it can guarantee that ATO auction makes each user truth-telling as a weakly dominant strategy to report his/her bid honestly. For the first condition, the monotonicity of the OS algorithm is easy to prove. On the one hand, when OS algorithm adopts STP, if user i bids a bigger value, i.e., b i ≥ b i and the corresponding task named t i , t i will be sorted ahead of task t i . Thus, if t i can be offloaded, then t i can also be offloaded. On the other hand, when OS algorithm adopts SUP,
will be sorted ahead of task t i . Therefore, in both cases, the first condition is satisfied in OS algorithm.
For the second condition, we should demonstrate that p i is the critical value for t i , i.e. bidding lower p i could prevent t i being allocated otherwise t i must be allocated. Suppose that t i is accepted in this iteration. In the case of STP, p i = b j , where t j is the first allocated task in T \ t i and t j ∈ T reject in the OS period, hence t i and t j must have collisions in the offloading scheduling. If user i's bidding b i < p i , then b i < b j and task i will be sorted following t j . Therefore, when t j is accepted, t i can not be allocated. For a similar reason, in the case of SUP,
Thus, t i will be sorted following t j and when t j is accepted, t i can not be allocated.
In short, the ATO auction can satisfy both conditions listed in Theorem 2.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of ATO auction mechanism, we do extensive simulations to evaluate the impact of main parameters. The performance metrics are demonstrated as follows.
1) Social benefit (B): The total benefit of each MEC server earned. In the offloading schedule period, it aims to schedule tasks to make MEC server's utility maximized. Note that the social benefit is the total payment of offloaded users by a non-truthful mechanism. 2) Frugality ratio: It is computed as ρ = B−P B , where P denotes the total payment by our truthful mechanism. Hence, the frugality ratio characterizes the cost that the server makes each user insisting on the truthfulness.
3) Utility of all offloaded users: We record the utility of offloaded users to verify the property of Individual Rationality. 4) Execution time: The execution time of ATO auction is the time to schedule offloading tasks plus the time consumed on payment determination, which represents the computational efficiency of mechanisms. 5) Approximation ratio: This metric mainly shows the performance of AOS algorithm. It illustrates how both greedy offloading schedule algorithms approach to the optimal solution (symboled as OPT), respectively.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
In our evaluation study, we consider a network composed of several MEC servers, each of which has a computation capacity of c s = 100 computation amount per second. Besides the setting in the evaluation of the frugality ratio, the basic revenue of each user δ i is randomly generated. All simulations are ran on a PC with 2.6GHZ CPU and 8GB memory. Each simulation is repeated 100 times, and the average values are reported as statistical results.
B. EVALUATION OF OFFLOADING SCHEDULE ALGORITHMS
We first evaluate the performance of ATO incentive mechanism with both current classic methods, random and FIFO (First In First Out). In the random scheme, the MEC server schedules tasks randomly, while in FIFO approach, the MEC server schedules tasks according to its request time, i.e., the first arrived task will be firstly scheduled. The user's computation capacity c i and computation amount of each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 3] and [1000, 5000], respectively. Since the access capacity of each MEC server is limited, the number of users N increases from 10 to 20 by a step of 2. Due to the heterogenous latency requirements, the duration from the current time to the deadline of each task is set to be η times of its computation time by MEC servers, where η is uniformly distributed among [1, 30] . Figure 6 shows MEC server's utility of ATO auction is always better than both classic schemes under the various numbers of users. Meanwhile, we can observe from Figure 6 that the utility of MEC server increases along with the rising number of users. This is due to the fact that the ATO auction provides better solutions than the other two because of its task pattern adaption.
C. EVALUATION OF APPROXIMATION RATIO
We evaluate the performance of the OS algorithm of ATO incentive mechanism. Since the OS problem is NP-hard, it is time-consuming to obtain the optimal solution with the general approach, i.e. brute force search. Hence, the approximate ratio of OS algorithm is only evaluated in settings with a small scale, since the MEC server has limited access capability. Specifically, the number of users is set within [4, 8] . The user's computation capacity c i and computation amount of each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 10] and [1000, 5000], respectively. Moreover, η is uniformly distributed among [1, 10] . Figure 7 shows the approximate ratio with the increasing number of users. It is clear that the social benefit of ATO mechanism is quite close to its corresponding optimal solutions. With the enlarge scale of users, the social benefit has a rising trend. The reason for that result is that the augment of users makes the server have better choices.
D. EVALUATION OF FRUGALITY RATIO
We investigate the impact of the frequency of bids fluctuation on the frugality ratio. The bid of each user is assumed to follow the standard normal distribution with the mean µ = 10000 and the standard deviation σ is uniformly distributed among [1000, 9000]. The number of users and computation amount of each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 10] and [1000, 2000], respectively. In addition, η is uniformly distributed among [1, 3] .
As shown in Figure 8 , the frugality ratio increases with the expanded standard deviation of bids. The reason is that the price difference, of the task with maximum total price or unit price and the one with the absence of the selected task, is enlarged with the expanding fluctuation of users' bids.
E. EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
In order to show all users have non-negative utility, we depict the empirical CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) of the utility for all users under various settings. Particularly, the computation amount of each task and η are uniformly distributed over [1000, 5000] and [1, 30] , respectively. For easy computation, the basic revenue of each user is fixed as 10. The number of users is selected as three cases from 25 to 40. In addition, the user's computation capacity c i is selected uniformly among [1, 3] . From Figure 9 , it is observed that the proportion of users with negative utility is zero. When the utility is zero, the value of CDF represents the proportion of unaccepted tasks. All users have non-negative utility, and the ATO auction mechanism achieves the property of individual rationality (see § III-E). 
F. EVALUATION OF COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
In order to demonstrate the computational efficiency of the proposed ATO mechanism, we compare the execution time of ATO with the other classic schemes, i.e., random and FIFO. To explore the impact of execution time on the number of users, the number of users is set to be uniformly distributed in the range of [0, 1000]. For the sake of more time resource to schedule, η is set as the random value in [1, 100] . Besides, the user's computation capacity c i and computation amount of each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 10] and [1000, 5000], respectively. Figure 10 demonstrates that the ATO auction mechanism has an inferior computational efficiency than the other schemes, but it is still in the feasible range even if the number of users increases to a large scale of 1000. Therefore, ATO auction mechanism satisfies the application requirements and has high computational efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate how to incentive MEC server with limited access and computation capability to offload tasks efficiently for the QoS requirements on task latency and security of intelligent ICPS applications. Specifically, on the one hand, we present a MEC server selection method under the access capability and security constraint for each user. On the other hand, an Adaptive Task Offloading (ATO) auction is presented to determine task schedules and the payment for each allocated task with deadline constraint, which has the ability to match various task patterns in ICPS applications. In addition, we propose a task pattern learning scheme to identify the current task pattern taking advantage of the historical information. Through theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism satisfies the properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality and truthfulness. Moreover, extensive simulations have been conducted to evaluate the performance of ATO auction has better superiority and efficiency than both classic greedy algorithms. SHUYUN LUO received the B.S. degree in electronic information engineering and the Ph.D. degree in communication and information system from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China, in 2008 and 2016, respectively. From 2012 to 2014, she was a Visiting Student with the Computer Science and Engineering Department, Pennsylvania State University. She is currently an Assistant Professor with the College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, China. Her research interests include mobile edge computing, ad hoc and sensor networks, and network economics.
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